Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

Butterfield Lumber, Inc. v. Jon L. McCoy, McCloy
Construction, James A. Arrowsmith, Gayle Z.
Arrowsmith, Peterson Mortgage Corporation, Ideal
Concrete Corporation, Reid's Concrete Service,
INC, Davis Brothers Cabinetmakers, INC, and
John Doe I : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David K. Broadbent; Thomas M. Melton; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellee.
Kent B. Linebaugh; James L. Thompson; Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn; Attorneys for
Defendant and Appellant Peterson Mortgage Corporation.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Butterfield Lumber, Inc. v. McCoy, No. 900425 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2818

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF 4r*>r/»j *
u<

**-'\-/f\t: i i \ u .

/ c c /.

'^

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JON L. McCLOY, d/b/a McCLOY
CONSTRUCTION, JAMES A.
ARROWSMITH, GAYLE Z. ARROWSMITH,
PETERSON MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
IDEAL CONCRETE CORPORATION,
REID'S CONCRETE SERVICE, INC.,
DAVIS BROTHERS CABINETMAKERS,
INC., and JOHN DOE I,

No. 900425-CA

ARGUMENT PRIORITY:

16

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE PAUL G. GRANT

David K. Broadbent (0442)
Thomas M. Melton (4999)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellee
Kent B. Linebaugh (1967)
James L. Thompson (5807)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Peterson Mortgage
Corporation

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
v.
JON L. McCLOY, d/b/a McCLOY
CONSTRUCTION, JAMES A.
ARROWSMITH, GAYLE Z. ARROWSMITH,
PETERSON MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
IDEAL CONCRETE CORPORATION,
REID'S CONCRETE SERVICE, INC.,
DAVIS BROTHERS CABINETMAKERS,
INC.,
and JOHN DOE I,

No.

900425-CA

ARGUMENT PRIORITY:

16

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE PAUL G. GRANT

David K. Broadbent (0442)
Thomas M. Melton (4999)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellee
Kent B. Linebaugh (1967)
James L. Thompson (5807)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Peterson Mortgage
Corporation

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CITED AUTHORITIES

(ii), (iii)

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

STATUTES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

5

ARGUMENT

5
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
BUTTERFIELD JUDGMENT ON ITS MECHANIC'S
LIEN
A.

B.

II.

5

Peterson Mortgage had Actual Notice
of Butterfield's Mechanic's Lien
Foreclosure

5

Butterfield Lumber's Lien Attaches
to the Proceeds of Peterson Mortgage's
Sale of the Property

9

BUTTERFIELD'S NOTICE OF LIEN DID NOT REQUIRE
AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
11

CONCLUSION

12

(i)

STATUTES CITED

Page(s)
Utah Code Annotated, (1990):
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d)

1

Section 38-1-7

2, 5, 6

Section 38-1-11

3, 5, 6, 7

Section 57-4a-2

3, 12

Section 57-3-1....'

11

51 Am. Jujr.2d § 60

9

(ii)

CASES CITED
Page(s)
Bonham v. Morgan,
788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1988)

1

Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company v. Professional United
World Travel Association, 592 P.2d 586 (Utah 1979)..

6, 7

Wallich Lumber Company v. Golds,
375 Mich. 323, 134 N.W.2d 722 (1965)

7

Collins v. Stockwell,
137 Ariz. 437, 671 P.2d 415 (Ariz. App. 1983)...

8

Smith v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co.,
27 Idaho 407, 150 P. 25 (1915)

8

Farmer's Feed & Supply v. Industrial Leasing,
286 Or. 311, 594 P.2d 397 (1979)

10

In re Tazewell County Collector,
130 111. App. 3d. 77, 473 N.E.2d 1013 (1985)

10

Morgan Plan Co. v. Bruce,
266 Ala. 494, 97 So.2d 805 (1957)

10

(iii)

ullr i Ml 1 I ' T H ' N M J .

This Cj'ivt
*- n^-

>

r

\\j-\

Q iOH-

nas
'

S 1 Al'UMENT

-ui.sdLCt

' * i .*

o

)ver

*r->

-ipceai

apartment

Third

s~ v , ( A e

" *

:^

; « *~ •

M-J;.::!.,

Summar,

There arr J n e e

jddgment

«

.- •

-LO^.O,

tu ^--: '.ei i ie J a
t.ie lili^o ^*" ^

"'cnPfV
.

art i or..

L.

;iai.

LO;

1

:; ty

_r.e at^encc ^i

pendens?
^

;\ - ^ *"^ ^he pr^^^^d" received by

Peterson Mortgage Corporation fro-:- ztr
property which is &ur- 3.

tor leview:

.... .sjage

roreclosure

LUI.^H
]

dated July 12, 1990,

issues ptesented

* ^er f i e "

]

a Notice

u me

/ and for Sri'5 I ~-.*e bounty

, :*

rtue

' 'Ufc:

• yjmmaiy judgment
Judicial Ci i: ,.*

ov

Does tr -

s i - .f * - *- ~eal

•
Dsence

>i Lien recorded June

?
ji in
__,

CKZI- AM edgment

. .

ii /-ii""-te

x.3zll

STANDARD 0^ APPELLATE REVIEW
I his appeaj presents no -i spt. + eri f.^rs for review
this Cou
statutory

^..:ions of
inieipifcLcitiu .

lower ooo - - dec: si on

fr r

de f rJl r ^ r 11- r • i 11 e i o! I. -1.

-

'.:*.•; 'Jourt
rA

,s -equired to review the

r r ectness ,_•--*

Bonhain v. Morgan, ' 8 8 P". , -] -

. ,• • .

ino

^x.

STATUTES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
UTAH CODE ANN. (1990):
Section 38-1-7:

Notice of claim - contents -

recording - service on owner of property.
(1) Each contractor or other person who
claims the benefit of this chapter within 80
days after substantial completion of the
project or improvement shall file for record
with the county recorder of the county in
which the property, or some part of the
property, is situated, a written notice to
hold and claim a lien.
(2) This notice shall contain a statement
setting forth the following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if
known or, if not known, the name of the
record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he
was employed or to whom he furnished the
equipment or material;
(c) the time when the first and last
labor or service was performed or the first
and last equipment or material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property,
sufficient for identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant
or his authorized agent and an
acknowledgment or certificate as required
under Chapter 3, Title 57. No
acknowledgment or certificate is required
for any notice filed after April 29, 1985,
and before April 24, 1989.
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice
of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or
mail by certified mail to either the reputed

-2-

owner or record owner of the real property a
copy of the notice of liens. If the record
'•owner's current address is not readily
available, the copy of the claim may be
mailed to the last-known address of the
record owner, using the names and addresses
appearing on the last completed real
property assessment rolls of the county
where the affected property is located.
Failure to deliver or mail the notice of
lien to the reputed owner or record owner
precludes the lien claimant from an award of
costs and attorneys' fees against the
reputed owner or record owner in -•• i-~
to enforce the lien.
-'

--

- Action : .; aei.t

s pendens

dttec'ea.

Actions •„ enioice cne ^eiib herein provided
for must be begun within twelve months aftei
the completion of the original contract, cr
the suspension of work thereunder for a
period of thirty days. Within the twelve
months herein mentioned the lien claimant
shall file for record with the county
recorder of each county i n wiii ch the 1 i ei 1 is
recorded a notice of the pendency of the
action, in the manner provided in actions
affecting the title or right to possession
of real property, or the lien shall be void,
except as to persons who have been made
parties to the action, and persons having
actual knowledge of the commencement of the
action, and the burden of proof shall be
upon the ] ien claimant and those claiming
under him to show such actual knowledge.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed
to impair or affect the right of any person
to whom a debt may be due for any work done
or materials furnished to maintain a
persona] action to recover the same.
Sec

•

.

c o n t e n t s nieapi t e d e f e c t s .
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A recorded document imparts notice of its
contents regardless of any defect,
irregularity, or omission in its execution,
attestation, or acknowledgment. A certified
copy of a recorded document is admissible as
evidence to the same extent the original
document would be admissible as evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Butterfield does not dispute Peterson Mortgage's
Statement of the Case set out in its Brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Butterfield Lumber supplied materials to

residential property located in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

Delivery of the materials commenced on January 8, 1987

and the last materials were delivered on April 10, 1987.
(R. at p. 237).
2.

The value of the lienable materials supplied to

the property was $4,043.80.

Butterfield Lumber was not paid

for the materials supplied and filed a Notice of Lien on June
18, 1987.
3.

(R. at p. 35).
Butterfield filed an action to foreclose its lien

on April 6, 1988.
4.

(R. at p. 238).

Peterson Mortgage received actual notice of the

commencement of Butterfield1s lien foreclosure on April 9,
1988.

(R. at p. 16) .
5.

Peterson Mortgage held a trustee's sale on or

about August 15, 1988.

The property was sold by Peterson

-4-

Mortgage to its president, Leon Peterson, an individual.
(R. at pp. 238-39).
6.
party.

Leon Peterson sold the property to a third

(R. at p. 239).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT 1:

Peterson Mortgage had actual notice of

Butterfield Lumber's action to foreclose its mechanic's lien.
Section 38-1-11 does not require the recordation of a lis
pendens if a party to be charged with the lien has actual
notice of the action.

The sale of the property by Peterson

Mortgage's president does not render Butterfield Lumber's lien
unenforceable.
ARGUMENT 2:

Butterfield Lumber's Notice of Lien is

valid pursuant to Section 38-l-7(e), Utah Code Ann. (1990), and
does not require an acknowledgment.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED BUTTERFIELD
JUDGMENT ON ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN
A.

Peterson Mortgage had Actual Notice of
Butterfield's Mechanic's Lien Foreclosure.

Peterson Mortgage acknowledges it had proper and
actual knowledge of Butterfield Lumber's action to foreclose
its lien.

A Summons and Complaint was served upon Peterson

-5-

Mortgage on or about April 7, 1988 (Record at p. 15). The
timely issuance and service of the Summons and Complaint gave
Peterson Mortgage actual notice of Butterfield Lumber's lien
foreclosure.
All parties with actual notice of a mechanic's lien
foreclosure action are subject to a valid lien.
§ 38-1-11 (1990).

Utah Code Ann.

In fact, Peterson Mortgage highlights this

fact in its Brief (Brief at p. 11). As a party with actual
notice of Butterfield Lumber's lien foreclosure action,
Peterson Mortgage is subject to judicial enforcement of
Butterfield Lumber's lien.
The requirement of a lis pendens set forth in § 38-1-7
protects an innocent purchaser who has neither actual nor
constructive notice of a lien or a lien foreclosure action.
That protection, however, does not extend to those parties with
actual notice of the action.

The clear statutory language

preserves Butterfield Lumber's lien rights against Peterson
Mortgage.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Harris-Dudley
Plumbing Co. v. Professional United World Travel Association,
592 P.2d 586 (Utah 1979), is controlling.

In Harris-Dudley,

the plaintiff sought foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, in spite
of the fact that the plaintiff had failed to file a lis pendens

-6-

on one parcel included in the foreclosure action.

As in the

instant case, after the initiation of the foreclosure action,
the subject property was conveyed.

Notwithstanding the absence

of a lis pendens, the trial court granted a judgment of
foreclosure against the new corporate owner of the subject
property, finding it had actual notice of the foreclosure
action,

^d. at 588.
In affirming the trial court, the Court held:
It is true as defendants argue that Section
38-1-11, U.C.A., 1953, requires that a
notice of lis pendens be filed within one
year or the lien is void. But defendants
ignore the exception contained in that
section that the lien would not be void as
to 'persons who have been made parties to
the action and persons having actual
knowledge of the commencement of the action.

Id.

As was the case in Harris-Dudley, Peterson Mortgage

Mortgage was a party to the foreclosure action and is subject
to Butterfield Lumber's lien.
Utah is not alone in recognizing this well-established
rule.

In a factually similar case, Wallich Lumber Company v.

Golds, 375 Mich. 323, 134 N.W.2d 722 (1965), the Michigan
Supreme Court determined that the absence of a lis pendens does
not affect parties with actual notice of a mechanic's lien
foreclosure action.

As in Utah, the Michigan statute required

the commencement of an action and the filing of a lis pendens.

-7-

The trial court had found that the plaintiff's mechanic's lien
was invalid because the plaintiff had not filed a lis pendens.
Reversing the lower court's decision, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that, as to parties with actual notice, a
lis pendens is not required.

The court stated:

Once a lien attaches, a liberal construction
should be made of the statute because of its
remedial character, [citations omitted.] A
liberal construction is achieved by holding
that the lis pendens need not be filed as to
those who have actual notice of the suit.
To hold otherwise would exalt constructive
notice over actual notice. [citations
omitted.] The trial judge was in error.
The filing of a lis pendens was unnecessary
as to defendants who had notice of the lien
and were sued and served within the one-year
period.
134 N.W.2d at 724.
An early Idaho decision explained the rationale for a
lis pendens requirement.

It stated that a lis pendens "is

necessary only for the purpose of giving record notice to
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of property who have no
actual knowledge of the action or claim upon which it is
based."

Smith v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co., 27 Idaho 407,

150 P. 25, 32 (1915).

See also, Collins v. Stockwell, 137

Ariz. 437, 671 P.2d 415, 418 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).

("No one

suggests that a lien on which a timely foreclosure is begun,
but no lis pendens is filed, ceases to become a lien as to all
persons with actual notice thereof.")

-8-

13.

Butterfield Lumber's Lien Attaches to the
Proceeds of Peterson Mortgage's Sale of the
Property.

Peterson Mortgage admits that it was a party with
actual notice of Butterfield Lumber's foreclosure action.
Peterson Mortgage now claims that its sale of the property,
after being joined as a party to the foreclosure action,
extinguishes Butterfield Lumber's lien.

Significantly,

Peterson Mortgage is unable to cite any legal or statutory
authority for its novel proposition.
Peterson Mortgage's argument would erode the validity
and value of liens generally, and is contrary to fundamental
equity principles.

The general statement of the law, as it

applies to lieAS, is set forth in 51 Am.Jur.2d § 60:
It is a principle of equity that one who has
a lieA upon property which is wrongfully
converted by another, with notice of the
lien, may have his lien fixed upon the
proceeds of the property where the lien upon
the property has thus been destroyed by the
wrongdoer. Thus, if the owner of property,
real or personal, upon which another has a
lien disposes of it to an innocent purchaser
for value who is protected from the lien,
the lienor has a right to have the lien
transferred to the proceeds of the property.
Peterson's action in foreclosing its junior interest
and then conveying the property does not allow it to avoid
Butterfield Lumber's lien.

The lien attaches to the proceeds

of the sale.

-9-

Courts have recognized this principle in a variety of
circumstances.

For example, the Alabama Supreme Court held:

It is well understood that when a person has
a lien on land or other property and the
holder of the legal title disposes of it to
one who is an innocent purchaser for value
and protected against such lien, the
lienholder has the right in equity to have
the court transfer his lien to what is
received as the consideration for the sale
thereby lifting his lien from the land or
other property.
Morgan Plan Co. v. Bruce, 266 Ala. 494, 497, 97 So.2d 805, 808
(1957).
In finding that a lienholder may follow the lien to
the proceeds, the Alabama court determined that the person
selling the property holds the proceeds in trust for the
benefit of the lienholder.

See also, In re Tazewell County

Collector, 130 111. App. 3d. 77, 473 N.E.2d 1013, 1014 (1985)
("A lien on property follows the property if moved, unless it
was sold to an innocent purchaser, in which case the lien
follows the proceeds of the sale."); Farmer's Feed & Supply v.
Industrial Leasing, 286 Or. 311, 317, 594 P.2d 397, 400 (1979)
("Where the owner of lien-subject property wrongfully disposes
of it, the proceeds stand in the place of the property sold.
In such cases, where equity jurisdiction attaches, the court
will dispose of the entire controversy and render a money
judgment.")
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April 24, 19 89,"

and instituted an acknowledgment requirement

for liens filed subsequent to April 24, 1989 (emphasis
supplied).

Butterfield Lumber's lien was clearly filed within

the period in which no acknowledgment was required.
The recording statutes themselves provide an
additional basis for denying Peterson's appeal.

Section

57-4a-2, Utah Code Ann. (1990), discusses defective or omitted
acknowledgments.

The statute provides:

A recorded document imparts notice of its
contents regardless of any defect,
irregularity, or omission in its execution,
attestation or acknowledgment.
The purpose of the recording statute is to give notice
of documents, not to validate them.
In conclusion, there is no applicable authority which
invalidates Butterfield Lumber's lien.

The trial court

properly denied Peterson's Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Butterfield Lumber held a valid, perfected lien
against the real property described in its Notice of Lien.
Peterson Mortgage had actual notice of the lien foreclosure
action filed by Butterfield Lumber.

Peterson Mortgage sold the

Property to its president, Leon Peterson, at the trustee's
sale.

When Leon Peterson conveyed the Property to a bona fide

purchaser, Butterfield Lumber's lien was transferred to the
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